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AUSTRALIA AND JAPAN – FACING THE 
FUTURE 
 
 
 
 
PRIME MINISTER JULIA GILLARD: 
OFFICIAL VISIT TO JAPAN – APRIL 2011 
“A FRIENDSHIP OF EQUALS. A PARTNERSHIP OF PEOPLES.” 
Statement by Julia Gillard – Japan National Press Club –  
22 April 2011  
2 | P a g e  
 
A POETIC PROLOGUE 
arly retirement requires a difficult decision 
Weighing up costs as well as disadvantages 
Ending a lifetime’s labour, idleness impacting on line of 
vision 
Confusion and uncertainty manifested in such packages 
 
n both Australia and Japan an aging work force 
Gingerly contemplates an increasingly narrow projection 
Limited options affecting such a change of course 
Ominous misgivings clouding everyone’s sense of direction. 
 
 
 
E 
 I 
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onetheless the business of high level government 
continues 
In the shape of leader to leader communication 
Trade and investment forming diplomatic sinews  
Developing mutually beneficial public policy formulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N 
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I. MINISTERIAL POLICY MAKING 
In April 2011, Prime Minister Julia Gillard made a State Visit to Japan, 
the first such high level diplomatic journey of her very-recently 
acquired Premiership. Speaking at the Japan National Press Club on 
Friday 22 April 2011, she described Japan and Australia as “close 
strategic partners”, who share “universal values of freedom, human 
rights and the rule of law.” 1 
Ms Gillard went on to say: 
“As active members of the United Nations we share a 
commitment to the peace, stability and prosperity 
that derives from a rule-based global order, in our 
region and across the world.” 2 
The Australian leader concluded by remarking that the Asia-Pacific 
region is the “most economically dynamic in the world”, consisting of 
three of the world’s largest economies. As such, the coming decades 
in the region held for Australia and Japan “great opportunities but 
also great challenges.” 3  
 
                                                          
1
 Julia Gillard, “Keynote Address to the Japan National Press Club”, Tokyo, 22 April 2011, Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet. Accessed 24 June 2012. 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Ibid. 
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Seven months later, in November 2011, Australian Foreign Minister 
Kevin Rudd gave the keynote address to the Australia-Japan 
Conference in Brisbane. The Foreign Minister described Japan as one 
of Australia’s “closest partners in Asia and the world.” Further, Mr 
Rudd described the security ties between each country as “pillars of 
strategic stability in our region.” 4 
Mr Rudd pursued this theme by saying: 
“... Ours is no marriage of convenience, but a deep set of 
bonds underpinned by shared values and common 
interests. These are fundamentals. But with clear vision for 
the future, we must build on these fundamentals. 
Together, we have done great work in building our 
international community, in extending security and 
prosperity in the Asia-Pacific. But we must do more...” 5 
 
[Foreign Ministers Rudd and Maehara, Canberra,  
23 November 2010.] 
                                                          
4
 Kevin Rudd, “Australia and Japan in the 21
st
 Century”, 4 November 2011, Keynote Address on Australia-Japan 
Relations, 7
th
 Australia-Japan Conference (AJC7), Brisbane, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.  Accessed 
24 January 2012. 
5
 Ibid. 
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On the basis of such top-level policymaking, it is clear that both 
nations take their relationship very seriously and are keen to 
maintain cordial relations along with mutually beneficial economic 
interaction. The following Table illustrates such interaction in terms 
of exports, imports and investment in each other’s country. 
AUSTRALIA-JAPAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
2010-2011 
ECONOMIC FACTOR VALUE (A$ BILLIONS) 
OVERALL TRADE A$16.6 BILLION SURPLUS FAVOURING 
AUSTRALIA (26% OF TWO WAY TRADE) 
MAJOR AUSTRALIAN EXPORTS COAL – A$15.3 BILLION  
(33% OF TOTAL EXPORTS) 
IRON ORE A$10.3 BILLION  
(22% OF TOTAL EXPORTS) 
MAJOR AUSTRALIAN IMPORTS PASSENGER CARS – A$45.9 BILLION  
(36% OF TOTAL IMPORTS) 
REFINED PETROLEUM – A$1.2 BILLION  
(7% OF TOTAL IMPORTS) 
INVESTMENT IN 2010 AUSTRALIA’S INVESTMENT IN JAPAN – 
A$29.1 BILLION 
JAPAN’S INVESTMENT IN AUSTRALIA – 
A$117.6 BILLION  
(FOUR TIMES LARGER) 
 
[SOURCE: DFAT, “Fact Sheet – Japan”.] Accessed 24 January 2012. 
 
Japan’s GDP in 2011 reached A$6.1 trillion, though its growth rate for 
2011 was minus 0.5%. By way of establishing a comparative 
proportion, Japan’s 2011 GDP out-stripped that of Australia’s 
(A$1.25 trillion) by 4.9 times. 6 
 
 
                                                          
6
 Analysis of DFAT and Australian Treasury Data. Financial figures converted to A$ from US$ using historical 
Exchange Rates. Analysis carried out by Author, Dr Michael Vaughan, on 25 January 2012. 
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Further, according to Australian Budgetary figures two years later, 
Japan’s investment in Australia in 2010 was 3.2 times Australian 
Government expenditure on roads, rail and ports (A$36 billion); or 
7.2 times Australian Government expenditure on hospital growth 
funding (A$16.4 billion); or 2.2 times Australian Government 
expenditure on these two areas combined (A$52.4 billion).7 
So, although Australia-Japan economic relations are on a sound and 
profitable footing, politically the relationship has had its tensions as 
well as its cordiality. The following Table depicts points of 
cooperation as well as points of contention as these have occurred in 
the bilateral relationship. 
TABLE: A “BALANCE SHEET” OF AUSTRALIA-JAPAN RELATIONS 
(AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN EACH COUNTRY) 
POINTS OF AGREEMENT POINTS OF CONTENTION 
A.  UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
MEMBERSHIP FOR JAPAN 
JAPANESE WHALE-HUNTING IN AUSTRALIAN 
WATERS 
B. STRONG ECONOMIC AND 
COMMERCIAL LINKAGES 
AUSTRALIAN FEAR OF JAPANESE ECONOMIC 
DOMINATION 
C. STIMULATION OF GLOBAL ECONOMY JAPANESE CONDEMNATION OF ‘VIOLENT 
PROTEST ACTIVITIES’ BY VESSEL SEA 
SHEPHERD 
D. REDUCTION OF GREEN HOUSE 
EMISSIONS 
JAPANESE CRITICISM OF AUSTRALIAN 
‘LAZINESS’ AND ‘INEFFICIENCY’ 
E. SUPPORT FOR CONVENTION OF THE 
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT 
DISPUTES 
LOSS OF JAPANESE ESTEEM FOR AUSTRALIA 
OVER PAULINE HANSON’S VIEWS ON ASIA 
F. NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT & 
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION 
JAPANESE COOLNESS OVER TRANS PACIFIC 
PARTNERSHIP FTA (OPPOSITION FROM 
JAPAN’S FARM LOBBY) 
[TABLE BASED ON ANALYSIS OF VARIOUS PUBLIC SOURCES BY AUTHOR, DR MICHAEL 
VAUGHAN, INCLUDING PRESS RELEASES, OPINION PIECES AND LEARNED COMMENTARY. 
SUCH MULTIPLE SOURCES ACCESSED BETWEEN 24 AND 25 JANUARY 2012]. 
 
                                                          
7
 Analysis by Author, Dr Michael Vaughan, of Australian Treasury “2012-2013 Budget at a Glance” Release. 
Accessed on 25 January 2012. 
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Further to the preceding Table, there is additional relevant evidence 
concerning the warmth and coolness of relations between Australian 
and Japan. Such evidence takes the form of the findings of an 
Opinion Poll, instigated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), 
determining the views Australians had of Japan in 2009/2010. The 
Poll makes for interesting reading, though caused shock and concern 
in Japan when it was published.8 Some of the findings appear in the 
following Table. 
MOFA OPINION POLL: AUSTRALIAN IMAGE OF JAPAN 
ISSUE RESPONSE “YES” RESPONSE “NO” 
JAPAN: A RELIABLE FRIEND 
OF AUSTRALIA 
20% 60% 
JAPAN: DIFFERENT AND 
DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND 
80% - 
JAPAN: SUFFICIENTLY ACTIVE 
IN WORLD AFFAIRS 
- 51% 
JAPAN: A PERMANENT 
MEMBER OF THE UN 
SECURITY COUNCIL 
43% 38% 
 
[SOURCE: MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TOKYO, MAY 2010.] 
There is a significant negative trend in the above responses. To a 
pertinent extent, this is attributable to the level of anger generated 
in Australia by the hunting of whales in Australian waters by 
Japanese vessels under an increasingly specious excuse of “scientific 
purposes.”  
                                                          
8
 Analysis of MOFA Opinion Poll by Author, Dr Michael Vaughan. Accessed 24 January 2012. The Poll was 
conducted in Australia in selected Capital Cities between 10 and 14 November 2009 and the results were 
published on 27 May 2010.  
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The Poll demonstrates that tensions can occur 
from time to time in a relationship that has 
now spanned some 55 years. It is probably 
healthy that such disagreements be aired and 
resolved as amicably as possible. Both sides 
like to “let off steam” – though in controlled 
circumstances – and express differences 
between them. 
Eventually, however, through the involvement of negotiators, 
diplomats, business executives, community groups and political 
leaders such differences between Australia and Japan are either 
resolved completely (such as the release of three Australian anti-
whaling protestors from Japanese custody without charge and 
without conviction under Japanese law) 9 , or, are quietly pushed into 
the background so as not to totally disrupt what is usually a friendly, 
cordial atmosphere.  
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 The three Australian anti-whaling protestors – Geoffrey Tuxworth, Simon Peterffy and Glen Pendlebury – 
illegally boarded the SHONAN MARU 2 under cover of darkness 40 kilometres off the coast of Western 
Australia. The ship was in international, not Australian, waters. Upon their release from Japanese custody 
aboard the ship, Prime Minister Gillard thanked the Japanese Government for its cooperation and roundly 
criticized the actions of the three men as being “unacceptable.” The Japanese Government apparently took 
the decision to release the illegal boarders because they had not injured any of the crew of the supply ship. 
The penalty under Japanese law for illegally boarding a ship is either a fine of 100,000 Yen (A$1,220) or 
imprisonment for a maximum of three years. (REUTERS, 9 January 2012; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 10 January 2012.) 
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II. EMERGENCE OF ASIA AS A KEY CENTRE FOR AUSTRALIA 
Australia’s engagement with Asia has clearly outpaced engagement 
with the rest of the world. Between 1990 and 2010, there has been 
strong growth in trade, education and tourism.10 
Australia’s trade engagement with Asia continues to grow at a rapid 
rate. In 2010, trade with Asia was 44.4% above that of trade of trade 
with the rest of the world. Three of Australia’s five single largest 
trading partners, accounting for around one third of total trade, are 
located in Asia (China, Japan and Korea.) 11 
In the past decade (2000 - 2010), the education of foreign students in 
Australia, particularly students from Asia, has become a key export-
earner for Australia. The countries dominating this growth have been 
China, India and Korea. 12 
 
 
The shutdown of Japan’s nuclear capacity will only add to rising Asian 
LNG demand and Australia is ready to meet it. Australia exported 
13.3 m tonnes of LNG to Japan in 2010 – second only to Malaysia (14 
m tonnes) – making it a potentially important source of supply to 
                                                          
10
 Leahy, Anne and Jensen, Paul H (2011), “Australia‘s Engagement with Asia: 1990 – 2010”, AUSTRALIAN 
ECONOMIC REVIEW 44 (4): 418-426. 
11
 Ibid, p. 422. 
12
 Ibid, p. 423. 
11 | P a g e  
 
compensate for the loss of nuclear power. Japan has a drive to 
obtain 40% of its oil and gas imports from Japanese-owned sources 
by 2030, compared with around 20% in 2010. 13 
 
III. CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN AUSTRALIA 
Climate policy under the conservative Howard Government (1995-
2007) in Australia was largely dictated by fossil fuel and mineral 
sector interests, and reflected a close alliance with the Bush 
Administration. The Howard Government shunned the Kyoto 
Protocol, refused to set national binding greenhouse gas reduction 
targets and preferred voluntary cooperative measures with industry. 
The Asia Pacific Partnership (APP) was 
intended to show a little policy 
movement on climate change whilst 
postponing serious action. 14 
Climate change was a key issue in the 
election of the Rudd Labor Government in 
December 2007.  
 
 
                                                          
13
 Anonymous (2011), “Australia to Meet Asian LNG Demand”, PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, April. 
14
 Lawrence, Peter (2009), “Australian Climate Policy and the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development 
and Climate (APP): From Howard to Rudd: Continuity or Change?” INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
AGREEMENTS: POLITICS, LAW AND ECONOMICS 9 (3): 281-299. 
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The Rudd Government quickly ratified Kyoto, adopted emission 
reduction targets and moved to introduce emissions trading. The 
Rudd Government, together with industry, supported APP because it 
provided bridges to China and India. 15 
IV. THE PROBLEM OF ‘WAR GUILT’ FOR JAPAN 
There are two central issues involved in this matter, these being, 
first, was Japan properly punished; and second, has Japan shown 
adequate contrition for wartime atrocities and crimes? 
Although successive Japanese Governments have apologized over 
the last few decades, these have been countered by periodic 
episodes within Japan revolving largely around history textbooks, the 
                                                          
15
 Ibid, p. 281. 
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remembrance of war dead and the 
quest by nationalists to restore 
national pride in the past. 16 
At the end of the Pacific War, Japan 
was confronted with not only building 
a new future, but dealing with a past 
that had wrought enormous 
devastation at home and abroad. 
 
 
 
That past includes an aggressive war of its own making accompanied 
by the appalling treatment of prisoners of war, which included 
forced labour, starvation, torture, biochemical experiments in 
Manchuria and numerous atrocities against civilians. 17 
 
                                                          
16
 Tannaka, Seiko and Lawson, Stephanie (2011) “War Memories and Japan’s ‘Normalization’ as an 
International Actor: A Critical Analysis” EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 17 (3):405-428. 
17
 Ibid, p. 410. 
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Japan as victim is one important aspect of the 
post war historical narratives, with the 
imagery of Nagasaki and Hiroshima serving to 
underscore the innocence of Japanese 
civilians. 18 
Prime Minister Koizumi’s behaviour, including 
his much-publicized Yasukuni Shrine visits, 
appeared to signal an end to “war guilt 
diplomacy.” 19 Another underlying 
interpretation is that Prime Minister Koizumi was openly and 
pointedly asserting that Japanese foreign policy is made in Tokyo and 
not in Beijing.  
Whatever the motives of one of Japan’s most popular and longest 
serving Prime Ministers, the effective result was that the more Japan 
attempted a more assertive ‘normal’ identity, the more it alienated 
its neighbours. 20 
V. JAPAN’S PROJECTED POLICY OPTIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
Prominent Singaporean academic, Kishore Mahbubani, has urged 
Japan to display greater leadership on the world stage and to act as a 
bridge between Asia and the West. In the current era, the West’s 
supremacy is waning while Asia is enjoying a resurgence, Mahbubani 
claimed in a recent interview. Japan, he avers, has a crucial role to 
                                                          
18
 Ibid, p. 414. 
19
 Ibid, p. 420. 
20
 Ibid. 
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play as the global power structure readjusts and 
should assume greater political leadership and 
pursue a more assertive foreign policy. 21 
In his view, Japan should stop playing “Tonto to 
America’s Lone Ranger”, suggesting Tokyo 
should end what he perceives to be subservience 
to Washington and instead act as “a partner of 
America and educate America on the new realities of Asia.” 22 
Mahbubani offers one final piece of considered external advice to 
one of Asia’s giants, Japan “should be the most Western country in 
Asia and the most Asian country in the West.” 23 
 
Despite such urgings, Japan’s foreign policy remains staunchly 
committed the US-Japan Security Alliance and will not shed the 
comforting and long-standing tactical and nuclear protection of its 
American ally.  
There are, of course, stresses within the relationship. Many 
American companies feel disadvantaged when trading in Japan, 
claiming unfair market practices. The United States also refuses to 
“budge an inch” over retaining its Marines Base on Okinawa – 
despite the openly-declared wish of Okinawans that the Americans 
leave and relocate elsewhere. The only circumstances under which 
                                                          
21
 Siti Rahil, “Japan told to be ‘Asia’s Bridge to the West’”, JAPAN TIMES, 13 January 2012. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Ibid. 
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Japan fully re-arms and acquires a thermo-
nuclear weapons arsenal would be either the 
loss of American protection or of its 
ineffectiveness over a long period of time. 
Japan feels that it really has little choice. 
Rearmament would violate established policy 
that has been in effect since 1951 and would 
greatly alarm not only its neighbours but also North Korea and a 
clandestine ‘army’ of subversive international terrorists. 
Thus, since the burst of Japan’s bubble economy in 1990, its political 
functions have stagnated, its enterprises have clung to their 
conventional operational methods and its people have assumed 
introspective, inward-looking attitudes. Japan’s friends overseas 
sound warnings – sometimes couched in sardonic tones – saying 
“Whereas people from China, South Korea and Taiwan are active 
abroad, what are Japanese doing?” 24 
It can be noted, though, that Japan is falling behind other countries 
in respect of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) by adhering to 
multilateral trade negotiations. China, in this respect, has 
successfully (and profitably) negotiated eight FTAs with several new 
trading partners, leaving Japan looking distinctly wrong-footed.25 
Additionally, Japanese negotiations for the Trans Pacific Partnership 
scheme, one of the most sweeping and potentially wealthy trading 
arrangements seen in the region in decades, are being hampered by 
domestic agricultural and medical lobby groups
                                                          
24
 Shinji Fukukawa, “Bring the World closer to Japan” JAPAN TIMES, 21 January 2012. Mr Fukukawa is a former 
MITI Vice-Minister. 
25
 China has built a network of 14 FTA partners, comprised of 31 economies, among which 8 Agreements have 
already been signed. Signatories thus far include ASEAN, Chile, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Macau, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, Peru and Singapore. China’s apparently most important criterion for seeking a FTA with a country 
consists of good political and diplomatic relations with that country, with economic strength being a secondary 
consideration. China will probably use its FTA networks to facilitate what it deems to be its “peaceful rise.” 
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 – farmers and doctors 
wielding powerful electoral influence 
which they are prepared to use to bring down an offending 
Government. 26 
VI. CONCLUSION: A DIPLOMATIC CROSSROADS 
Australia is at an historical crossroads: it must choose between a 
strategy of regional engagement designed to pursue community 
building and avoid security dilemmas, or one that designates China 
as a rising strategic challenge that ultimately cannot be 
                                                          
26
 Ibid. 
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accommodated and thus must be contained with like-minded allies.27
 
For the first time in its history, Australia is confronting a situation 
where its major economic partner is not the same as its major 
security ally, creating a division of Australian national interests. Japan 
likewise risks alienating a China whose economy increasingly 
dominates Japanese trading interests. 28 
 
                                                          
27
 William Tow, “Essay: The Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JADSC) and Asia-Pacific 
Strategic Geometries”, Nautilus Institute at RMIT, Melbourne, updated 10 April 2010. 
28
 Ibid. 
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EPILOGUE 
“AME FUTTE CHI KATAMARU”/  
“AFTER THE RAIN, EARTH HARDENS” 
[INTERPRETATION: ADVERSITY BUILDS CHARACTER.] 
